How Should Obama Deal with ISIS in Iraq?
Saleem Suzah
06 / 08 / 2016
Almost all Iraqi officials, as well as the Republicans in America, still blame Obama’s administration for not being “serious” in confronting the Islamic State in Iraq IS, or ISIS. The U.S. President, Barak Obama, acknowledges several times that he does not have a completed strategy to deal with ISIS yet. This statement, along with the ineffective raids of the international alliance against ISIS in Iraq, is understood by Iraqis as being either weakness or unseriousness of confronting ISIS. In fact, Obama’s incomplete strategy about ISIS is not because of his weakness or unseriousness, but because of his confusion of how to deal with this terrorist organization. The nature of the sectarian struggle in Iraq and its complexities has left no room for Obama’s administration to fight ISIS without strengthening one side against another.
There are three groups in Iraq that now fight ISIS, the Shiite-led government’s national forces with its Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), The Kurdish Peshmerga Forces, and the Sunnis’ tribal volunteers. Although these three groups are, as it appears, coordinating to regain the Iraqi lands occupied by ISIS since June 2014, it seems that they have no future plan of how to run the political situation of post-ISIS Iraq. Each one of these three groups has its own political agendas behind that fight.
Kurds are fighting ISIS to reclaim what they see as historical Kurdish lands forcibly taken by Arabs under Saddam’s regime. It is time for Kurds to regain these lands as a necessary step before announcing an independent Kurdish state at the northern part of Iraq. The Kurdish fight against ISIS is not for a unified Iraq because there is “no such thing as Iraq any more,” a Peshmerga leader says in The Guardian (Chulov, 2016). This is no longer a secret thing but a publically-announced desire that all Kurdish officials believe in. Dr. Najmaldin Karim, the Kurdish governor of Kirkuk – a disputed northern province that both the Kurdistan regional and the Iraqi federal governments claim, declared to a group of reporters in Washington last week that “Kirkuk needs to get away from Baghdad” (Mcleary, 2016). He criticized the U.S. forces that “American young men are losing their lives to keep a country together that doesn’t want to be together.” Karim puts pressure on Obama’s administration not to sacrifice more American blood for a country that is falling apart soon. However, Kurdish leaders still ask for Americans’ support to make the region’s new borders possible; the new borders that “will be drawn in blood” as Massoud Barzani, the President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, says (Charbel, 2015).
The Iraqi national forces and the PMF seem not to have a common goal with the Sunni fighters and Kurdish Peshmerga in the fight against ISIS. The Shiite-led government has not reached a compromise with Sunni political leaders that can build a trust between the two parties. Sunnis do not trust Baghdad and feel paranoid of PMF that the latter would commit a systematic killing against Sunnis, as they have been accused of supporting ISIS, if it expelled ISIS out of the Sunni cities. ISIS does not represent Sunnis; however, Sunnis are not willing to replace ISIS with PMF. They are, actually, not even enthusiastic to see the Iraqi national forces in their cities again as the distrust between Sunnis and the Shiite-dominated government still exists. Sunni leaders recently started to ask for self-government in Sunni Arab areas of Iraq, and they hope that Obama’s administration supports them to achieve such a goal after defeating ISIS. The Iraqi government is suspicious of such a Sunni demand and will never bargain Shiite hegemonic influence for a potential Sunni insurgency that could lead to an independent Sunni state in the future.
For the Iraqi government, the victory upon ISIS is important to reestablish the government’s influence on the Sunni areas again. It also to reproduce Iraqis’ confidence in the military establishment after it has been insulted by ISIS two years ago. Defeating ISIS can be now an appropriate way out for the political crisis that has been taking place since months because of the increasing protests due to the lack of security and services in Iraq. In March 30th, Iraqi protesters – most of them follow the Shiite prominent cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr – stormed the Green Zone (the highly-secured zone in Baghdad) and occupied the House of Representatives as a way to show their anger because of the government’s deceleration in its reformist policies and procedures. Although the protesters left the Green Zone at the same day they stormed it, the movement paralyzed the House of Representatives, official ministries, and the other governmental establishments. It created a big chaos and political predicament, and only a military victory upon ISIS would help release a little such a public tension. The Iraqi government seeks that victory at any cost now.
The three parties (Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds) have no common vision of how post-ISIS era should be handled. The Iraqi war on ISIS reveals publically what it has been denied since the collapse of Saddam’s regime by the American military intervention in 2003. It reveals the decay of the idea of unified Iraq. The war of Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds on ISIS implies a war on each other behind. Each party seeks a victory on ISIS to draw its own future borders and influence. “For us, this is about reclaiming our land. For them, this is a religious war,” A Kurdish Peshmerga leader, briefly but honestly, reveals Kurds and Shiite-led government’s goals behind their war together on ISIS (Yar, 2016).
Obama’s lack of obvious strategy against ISIS – or I should say, Obama’s confusion of how to deal with ISIS – derives from the lack of an Iraqi unified strategy against this terrorist organization. Obama should work out a plan that takes into account the Iraqi government’s goals, Sunnis’ fears, and Kurds’ demands behind the war on ISIS in Iraq. But, is this a handy plan, though? How should Obama deal with ISIS in Iraq if Iraqis themselves have not yet developed a working plan to deal with the political situation in post-liberated Iraq? A question that has never been answered by the Iraqi political class but postponed to have Obama’s administration blamed with.
References
Charbel, G. (2015, February 15). Barzani: The region's new borders will be drawn in blood (T. Huffman, Trans.). Al-Monitor. Retrieved May 17, 2016, from http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2015/02/barzani-iraq-peshmerga-kurds-islamic-state-interview.html
Chulov, M. (2016, May 11). Mosul: Suspicion and hostility cloud fight to recapture Iraqi city from Isis. The Guardian. Retrieved May 17, 2016, from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/mosul-the-city-that-will-define-not-just-iraqs-war-but-its-future CMP=share_btn_fb&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New Campaign&utm_term=%2ASituation Report
Mcleary, P. (2016, May 11). Oil politics: Iraqi Kurdish official calls for country's split. Foreign Policy. Retrieved May 17, 2016, from http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/11/oil-politics-iraqi-kurd-politician-calls-for-countrys-split/
Yar, C. (2016). ‘The Peshmerga isn’t afraid of ISIS’. Foreign Policy. Retrieved May 17, 2016, from http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/12/the-peshmerga-isnt-afraid-of-islamic-state-iraqi-army-makhmour/
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There are three groups in Iraq that now fight ISIS, the Shiite-led government’s national forces with its Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), The Kurdish Peshmerga Forces, and the Sunnis’ tribal volunteers. Although these three groups are, as it appears, coordinating to regain the Iraqi lands occupied by ISIS since June 2014, it seems that they have no future plan of how to run the political situation of post-ISIS Iraq. Each one of these three groups has its own political agendas behind that fight.
Kurds are fighting ISIS to reclaim what they see as historical Kurdish lands forcibly taken by Arabs under Saddam’s regime. It is time for Kurds to regain these lands as a necessary step before announcing an independent Kurdish state at the northern part of Iraq. The Kurdish fight against ISIS is not for a unified Iraq because there is “no such thing as Iraq any more,” a Peshmerga leader says in The Guardian (Chulov, 2016). This is no longer a secret thing but a publically-announced desire that all Kurdish officials believe in. Dr. Najmaldin Karim, the Kurdish governor of Kirkuk – a disputed northern province that both the Kurdistan regional and the Iraqi federal governments claim, declared to a group of reporters in Washington last week that “Kirkuk needs to get away from Baghdad” (Mcleary, 2016). He criticized the U.S. forces that “American young men are losing their lives to keep a country together that doesn’t want to be together.” Karim puts pressure on Obama’s administration not to sacrifice more American blood for a country that is falling apart soon. However, Kurdish leaders still ask for Americans’ support to make the region’s new borders possible; the new borders that “will be drawn in blood” as Massoud Barzani, the President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, says (Charbel, 2015).
The Iraqi national forces and the PMF seem not to have a common goal with the Sunni fighters and Kurdish Peshmerga in the fight against ISIS. The Shiite-led government has not reached a compromise with Sunni political leaders that can build a trust between the two parties. Sunnis do not trust Baghdad and feel paranoid of PMF that the latter would commit a systematic killing against Sunnis, as they have been accused of supporting ISIS, if it expelled ISIS out of the Sunni cities. ISIS does not represent Sunnis; however, Sunnis are not willing to replace ISIS with PMF. They are, actually, not even enthusiastic to see the Iraqi national forces in their cities again as the distrust between Sunnis and the Shiite-dominated government still exists. Sunni leaders recently started to ask for self-government in Sunni Arab areas of Iraq, and they hope that Obama’s administration supports them to achieve such a goal after defeating ISIS. The Iraqi government is suspicious of such a Sunni demand and will never bargain Shiite hegemonic influence for a potential Sunni insurgency that could lead to an independent Sunni state in the future.
For the Iraqi government, the victory upon ISIS is important to reestablish the government’s influence on the Sunni areas again. It also to reproduce Iraqis’ confidence in the military establishment after it has been insulted by ISIS two years ago. Defeating ISIS can be now an appropriate way out for the political crisis that has been taking place since months because of the increasing protests due to the lack of security and services in Iraq. In March 30th, Iraqi protesters – most of them follow the Shiite prominent cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr – stormed the Green Zone (the highly-secured zone in Baghdad) and occupied the House of Representatives as a way to show their anger because of the government’s deceleration in its reformist policies and procedures. Although the protesters left the Green Zone at the same day they stormed it, the movement paralyzed the House of Representatives, official ministries, and the other governmental establishments. It created a big chaos and political predicament, and only a military victory upon ISIS would help release a little such a public tension. The Iraqi government seeks that victory at any cost now.
The three parties (Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds) have no common vision of how post-ISIS era should be handled. The Iraqi war on ISIS reveals publically what it has been denied since the collapse of Saddam’s regime by the American military intervention in 2003. It reveals the decay of the idea of unified Iraq. The war of Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds on ISIS implies a war on each other behind. Each party seeks a victory on ISIS to draw its own future borders and influence. “For us, this is about reclaiming our land. For them, this is a religious war,” A Kurdish Peshmerga leader, briefly but honestly, reveals Kurds and Shiite-led government’s goals behind their war together on ISIS (Yar, 2016).
Obama’s lack of obvious strategy against ISIS – or I should say, Obama’s confusion of how to deal with ISIS – derives from the lack of an Iraqi unified strategy against this terrorist organization. Obama should work out a plan that takes into account the Iraqi government’s goals, Sunnis’ fears, and Kurds’ demands behind the war on ISIS in Iraq. But, is this a handy plan, though? How should Obama deal with ISIS in Iraq if Iraqis themselves have not yet developed a working plan to deal with the political situation in post-liberated Iraq? A question that has never been answered by the Iraqi political class but postponed to have Obama’s administration blamed with.
References
Charbel, G. (2015, February 15). Barzani: The region's new borders will be drawn in blood (T. Huffman, Trans.). Al-Monitor. Retrieved May 17, 2016, from http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2015/02/barzani-iraq-peshmerga-kurds-islamic-state-interview.html
Chulov, M. (2016, May 11). Mosul: Suspicion and hostility cloud fight to recapture Iraqi city from Isis. The Guardian. Retrieved May 17, 2016, from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/mosul-the-city-that-will-define-not-just-iraqs-war-but-its-future CMP=share_btn_fb&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New Campaign&utm_term=%2ASituation Report
Mcleary, P. (2016, May 11). Oil politics: Iraqi Kurdish official calls for country's split. Foreign Policy. Retrieved May 17, 2016, from http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/11/oil-politics-iraqi-kurd-politician-calls-for-countrys-split/
Yar, C. (2016). ‘The Peshmerga isn’t afraid of ISIS’. Foreign Policy. Retrieved May 17, 2016, from http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/12/the-peshmerga-isnt-afraid-of-islamic-state-iraqi-army-makhmour/
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